There is a paper in our seminar schedule about the monopolist’s product launch strategy in multiple markets. Its highly stylized, but heck, its a start.There are N > 1 markets in which the monopolist can launch her product. The monopolists decision is to decide how many markets in which to launch. She can launch in all, in some, or none of these markets. For some reason, (unexplained, but i assume for simplicity), price p is fixed, at say 1/2. The good is either high quality, and its value v is 1, or low quality, where in its v is 0. The monopolist doesn’t know the quality of the good, which explains why we have non-discriminatory pricing. If the monopolist knew about her products quality, she would set two different prices and there would be a separating equilibrium. [Which raises an interesting question: how can a monopolist not know the quality of the product?]
The consumers belief about the value (lambda) takes values from (0,1). The consumer buys v-p>0 [This is confusing, it should be lambda-p>0? Is lambda the distribution of consumer's unit demands? I think the author wants to say that lambda is the same for each consumer in a market, which means its just like assuming one consumer per market, not terribly interesting].
Whats interesting is the updating method. Imagine you are in a market, and you observe a ’signal’ (she doesn’t explain what this signal might be, but this is a random signal) from another market where the product is launched. This signal can either be good or bad. A good signal may mean that the value of the good is 1 (the highest possible). A bad signal is defined similarly. A signal is independently and identically distributed across markets and time.
However, like many signals in life, signals are noisy. Let q = Prob(signal=1|v=1) =Prob(signal=0|v=0). That is, q is the probability that the signal is correct.We assume here that signals are more likely to be correct than not: q>1-q. [note: if this isn't true, then the graph i present below will switch].
The updating of beliefs on the product’s value is of interest to the monopolist. The monopolist would prefer to launch sequentially, IF she can manipulate willingness to pay in markets where she has not launched yet. In terms of the signal, if the signal is good, this implies, by Bayesian updating, those who see this signal would revise their beliefs/lambdas upward which raises demand.
Put in simply, this is kinda like viral marketing. Launch a product for a small group first. They tell the world that the product is good once they consume it and know its good. The rest of the world sees the signal and says, hey, windows vista is better than i thought… so they revise their valuations upward based on this signal. Similarly, if the signal is bad, they revise their values downward.
A consumer in a market where the good has not been launched has two pieces of information. The performance in the first market(s) in which it has been launched, as well as the random signal defined earlier.
Below you find a graph depicting the bayesian updating of beliefs:

Given that the price is 1/2, if lambda=lambdalow or less, then the succeeding markets will never buy the good, no matter what the realization of the signal. Hence you will never launch the good. We say that the consumer here is extremely pessimistic.
If lambdalow<lambda<p=1/2, then something interesting happens. Here, we say the consumer is pessimistic — the prior belief is that the good is ‘overpriced’.
Assume for simplicity two markets, and we consider a sequential launch which simply means launching one market at a time. Lets say the good was succesful (which means it received a good signal) in the first market; this leads to an updating upwards for the second market. But there is also a random signal A good random signal leads people to buy, a bad random signal lowers their lambda further. So,if the signal in market one is good and the signal is market two is good, there is no difference between sequential and simultaneous launch. Both markets buy anyway. If the signal in market one is good, and the random private signal in market 2 is bad, then the two signals cancel each other out, leading to lower total sales (good sales in market 1, no sales in market 2) — an inferior outcome which is came from the fact that the product was launched sequntially. If the signal if the first market is bad, and the second is bad, no one buys — but this would be true in a simultaneous launch too.
So the dominant strategy is to simultaneously launch.
[Note: its important here that you have representative, identical consumers in each market to get this result. If you abandon these, the analysis becomes more involved, but still follows the general line of reasoning outlined above]
If p=1/2>lambda<lambda high, something interesting happens. This time, the consumer is optimistic. Here, if you have simultaneous launch, each market will receive a random signal of s, which causes some to buy, others not.
If the launch is sequential, there are two signals for the later market: success/failure in the first and a private random signal in the second market.
The reasoning is similar to the preceeding case. If the signals are opposing, then they cancel out — but thats fine because the lambda>p and they (the second market) still buys. If the signals are the same, clearly both markets buy the good. We see why sequential benefits the monopolist — its a form of random signal hedging. A sequential launch allows opposing signals to cancel outwhich leads to higher total sales, while in a simultaneous launch, opposing signals mean random successes which is inferior.
Finally, if lambda>lambdahigh>1/2, then no matter what the realization of the signal, each market buys the product. so sequential is the same as simultaneous.
This is nice model that allows us to see how sequential launches help a monopolist when there is information assymmetry both for the seller and the buyer. They way the author explains the mechanism and demand was confusing at first. Also, the next step would be to endogenize the signal as a function of market variables, like sales and quantity and price. I also don’t like that latter markets have two signals. I’d rather model it as one signal, and then each market is heterogenous along a certain dimension. In this way, we might be able to get the result that if a sequential launch is implemented, then the first market must have the larger market size, or higher profit potential. This is much more realistic.